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BREACH OF THE PEAcE-ARREST FOR POSSESSION OF LiQuoR-Defendant
was asleep in his automobile, parked without lights on the highway. At 2 A. M.
Sunday morning, officers awakened him to look at his license cards. They
smelled liquor and searched the car, finding liquor in cans in the rear seat
768
Held: a breach of the peace. Commonwealth v. Dakich, 73 Pitts. L. J.
(Pa. C. C., 1924).
A breach of the peace is a violation of public order or decorum, a disturbance of public tranquillity, by any act or conduct inciting to violence or tending
to provoke others to break the peace. Davis v. Burgess, 54 Mich. 514, 2o N. W.
1812) ; Lentz v.
540 (1884) ; Commonwealth v. Taylor, 5 Binn. 277, 281 (Pa.,
(1911).
1116
R.
D.
Pa.
Raum, 21
In Commonwealth v. Krubeck, 23 Pa. C. C. 35 (I896), the court, referring
to the nature of breaches of the peace, says at p. 38, "the element of violence,
actual or threatened, which was essential, . .. was wanting."
In the instant case, the court says at p. 769, "it is a violation of peace
or order because it tends to the disturbance of peace or order, although it be
not a violent demonstration."
The court goes rather far in finding that this automobile-parked on the
highway with the owner asleep at the wheel----"tended to the disturbance of
peace or order," and the court's next statement is hardly reconcilable with the
statement in Commonwealth v. Krubeck, supra.
According to the Act of 1705, Pa. St i92o, § 2o25o, no warrant, etc., may
issue on Sunday except for treason, felony or breach of the peace: a fortiori,
an arrest without warrant would be lawful only for such offenses. Since violation of the Liquor Law of 1923, P. L. 34, Pa. St. Supp. 1924, § i4o98a, is
only a misdemeanor (§ Io), the act of the officers would be unlawful unless
this were a breach of the peace. And so, to convict an obviously guilty defendant, the court stretches the definition of breach of the peace almost beyond its
very elastic limits.
CoNsTITuTIONAL LAw-DuE PROCESs-PRoHIBITION OF POSSESSION OF
LIQUOR LAWFULLY AcQuIRED--It was provided by a Georgia statute, Acts Ga.
home
1917 (Laws Ex. Sess. 1917, § 18), that the possession of liquor in the
was unlawful though for private use. A quantity of liquor which the plaintiff had acquired before the passage of the act, and which had been used in
his home for family purposes was seized by state agents. Petition for an
injunction to prevent the destruction of the liquor, and to obtain a recovery,
refused in the Georgia courts, and in the Supreme Court of the United States
the appellant urged as the principal ground for reversal that he was being
deprived of his property without due process of law. Held: The statute
extended to the situation where the liquor had been lawfully acquired before
the enactment of the statute. Samuels v. McCurdy, 267 U. S. 188 (1925).
The statute, the constitutionality of which is thus upheld, goes further,
of course, than the National Prohibition Act. There, it is provided that the

S19o)
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possession of liquor lawfully acquired and for private use in the home is not
unlawful, 41 Stat. 305, Tit. 2, §33.
It is within the police power of the state to prohibit the manufacture and
sale of intoxicating liquors. This principle is so well established as to require
no citation of authority. That the state may through its police power prohibit
the continued possession of lawfully acquired liquor is, however, a proposition
which cannot be given such unqualified acceptance. In the past the Supreme
Court has approached the problem with extreme diffidence. The question has
been referred to as an open one in a number of cases: Barteineyer v. Iowa,
i8 Wall. 129 (U. S., 1873) ; Eberle v. Michigan, 232 U. S. 700 (1914) ; Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries,251 U. S. 146 (1919).
In Crane v. Campbell, 245 U. S. 304 (917), the constitutionality of an

Idaho statute similar to the Georgia statute was upheld, but the point was not
raised whether or not the liquor had been acquired before the passage of the
act. The court in Samuels v. McCurdy, supra, leans heavily upon the decision
in Barbour v. State of Georgia, 249 U. S. 454 (1919), but the possession of
the liquor in the Barbour case was acquired after the passage of the act,
although before it went into effect.
In the majority of the state courts where this question has been raised
the decisions are opposed to the rule in the principal case. In re Seven Barrels
of Wine, 79 Fla. i, 83 So. 627 (1920) ; Commonwealth v. Smith, 163 Ky. 227,
173 S. W. 340 (1915) ; State v. Gilnan, 33 W. Va. 146, io S. E. 283 (1889).
Also opposed are BLACK, INTOXICATING LIQUORS 5o; DABNEY, LIQUOR PaOis in
HIBiTION 63. But Edmunds v. State, igg Ala. 555, 74 So. 965 (917)

accord with Samuels v. McCurdy, supra.
The decision in the principal case cannot be characterized as a radical
departure, but may fairly be said to stretch the elastic principle of the police
power of the states to a greater degree than has hitherto been attempted.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-TAXATION OF MuNIcI'AL PUBLIC UTILITY LOCATED OUTSIDE MuNIcIPALITY-A state law exempted

from taxation all publicly owned property except "municipal electric light
plants located outside the town where the municipality is situated." This classification affected only three municipalities in the state and the plaintiff sought
to recover taxes paid to defendant town under protest on the grounds that the
classification was arbitrary and so deprived it of the equal protection of the
law guaranteed by the Constitution, i4th Amendment, and the Vermont Constitution, Art. 9, Ch. I. Held (two dissenting): Plaintiff cannot recover.
Village of Hardwicke v. Town of Wolcott, 129 Atl. 159 (Vt., 1925).
A municipality is not entitled to the protection of the Constitution as
against the state, when it is functioning as a branch of a state government.
Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 2o7 U. S. 16i (io7); I COOLEY, TAXATION

(3d ed.), 82. However, the courts almost universally distinguish between
property owned by the municipality in its governmental function and that
owned in its proprietary function. Dickinson v. Boston, iss Mass. 595, 75
N. E. 68 (i9o5) ; and see Hunter v. Pittsburgh,supra, p. 178; but see Black v.
Columbia, i9 S. C. 412, 443 (1883). See also 23 MIcH. L. REV. 325 (1924)-
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Vermont decisions have uniformly held that the property of a municipality owned
in its proprietary function was protected by the due process clause. .Poultney v.
Wells, I Aik. i8o (Vt., 1826) ; Montpelier v. East Montpelier, 29 Vt. 12
(1856) ; Sargent v. Clark, 83 Vt. 523, 77 AtI. 337 (i91o). Municipal electric
light plants are usually considered as owned in the proprietary function. Sykes
v. Village of Portland, i77 Mich. 290, 143 N. W. 326 (1913); Swanton v. Village of Highgate, 8i Vt. 152, 69 Atl. 667 (igo8) ; cf. Western Savings Fund v.
Philadelphia,31 Pa. i75, 183 (858).
In the principal case the court held that the classification complained of
was not arbitrary, and therefore constitutional. Bell's Gap R. R. v. Pa., 134
U. S. 232 (189o) ; State v. Clement National Bank, 84 Vt 67, 78 Adt. 944
There would be no difficulty with this basis of decision, but the
(19io).
majority of the court, ignoring the Vermont decisions on the subject, continue with the dictum that a municipality is not entitled to the protection of
the Constitution in any function. This in turn is based on a dictum in a recent
case in the Supreme Court of the United States, Trenton v. New Jersey, 262
U. S. 182, i91 (1923). These dicta may indicate that distinguishing between
the public and private functions of a municipality has reached its limit, and
that a trend in the opposite direction has begun.
CONTRACTS-ENFORCEMENT IN EQUITY-MUTuALiTY-Plaintiffs, the vendors, sought specific performance of a contract to sell land. Proper deeds to
the land were executed and tendered by all having an interest therein. Defendants alleged lack of mutuality in that some of plaintiffs were not bound by
contract when made. Held: Lack of mutuality was no defense. Meier Grape
Juice Co. v. Koehne, Court of Appeals of Ohio, September 25, 1925.
The strict older view is that mutuality of remedy is to be ascertained as
of the time when the contract was made. Luse v. Deitz, 46 Iowa 205 (877) ;
Norris v. Fox, 45 Fed. 406 (C. C., i891). This view is still adhered to in
some few jurisdictions. Childs v. Reed, 34 Idaho 450, 2o2 Pac. 685 (1921).

The prevailing view today is that it is not essential that mutuality of remedy
shall exist at the inception of the contract and that an original want of mutuality may be supplied by performance of the unenforceable condition. Smurr v.
Kamen, 301 Ill. 179, 133 N. E. 715 (i92i) ; Epstein v. Gluckin, 233 N. Y. 49o,
135 N. E. 86i (1922) ; Rittenhouse v. Swiecicki, 94 N. J. Eq. 36, 118 Atl. 261
The principal case is in accord with this rule.
(1922).
Since the purpose of the doctrine of mutuality is to work out the equities
between the parties, it would seem that the prevailing view is the better one,
for where a valid contract exists, even though unenforceable at its inception
because of lack of mutuality, equity should specifically enforce the contract
at the suit of one party if it can assure the other of that for which he contracted.
CONTRACTS-STATUTE OF FRAUDS-ORAL MODIFICATION OF CONTRACT FR
SALE OF LAND-ESToPI'EL-A written contract provided that defendants should

convey property to plaintiff subject to mortgages to be held by banks. In
compliance with an oral request of plaintiff's made shortly after the signing
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of the contract, defendants tendered the deed with the mortgages made out
to individuals. Plaintiff then refused to accept it, and sued for his deposit.
Held: Plaintiff estopped to set up the written agreement. Gold v. Schneider,
13o Ati. 133 (N. J., 1924).
By the great weight of authority a contract required by the Statute of
Frauds to be in writing cannot be modified by subsequent oral agreement
Reid v. Diamond Plate-Glass Co., 85 Fed. 193 (C. C. A., 1898) ; Abrams v.
Eckenrode, 136 2Md 244, 11O AtI. 468 (192o) ; Schaap v. Wolf, 173 Wis. 351,
181 N. W. 214 (1921). Where, however, the agreement as modified has been
acted upon, a number of courts hold that the rights of the parties are to be
determined by the modified agreement. Smiley v. Barker, 83 Fed. 684 (C. C. A.,
1897); Denison v. Sawyer, 95 Minn. 417, 1o4 N. W. 305 (igo5); Producers"
In one class of
Coke Co. v. Hoover, 268 Pa. 1O4, IIO Atl. 733 (1920).
decisions estoppel has been invoked in order to bar a party who has given his
assent to a subsequent oral agreement from taking advantage of the failure
of the other party to comply with the original contract. Swain v. Seamens,
9 Wall. 254 (U. S., 1869); Hecht v. Marsh, 1o5 Neb. 5o2, 18I N. W. 135
(192o); Imperator Realty Co. v. Tull, 228 N. Y. 447, 127 N. E. 263 (192o).
It would seem that in Gold v. Schneider, supra, such an estoppel was properly
raised in favor of the defendants, they having been able to perform according to
the written contract and having varied their performance only on the faith of
the plaintiff's conduct.
CONTRACTs-STATUTE

OF LImiTATIONS-AGREE MENT

NOT TO

PLEAD--The

defendant's intestate, in a contract not under seal, promised to pay his divorced
wife a certain sum per month for the support of a child, and further promised
not to plead the Statute of Limitations to any payment, due under the contract,
for a period of ninety-nine years. In this suit, thirty-seven years later, to
recover all payments but the first, his administrator set up the Statute of
Limitations as a defense. Held: The agreement not to plead the Statute was
binding upon the defendant Brownrigg v. DeFrees, 238 Pac. 714 (Cal., 1925).
There is a great diversity of opinion, and scarcity of reasons, in the cases
on the question as to whether or not an agreement to waive the Statute of
Limitations is void as against public policy. Fearing a virtual overthrow of the
Statute through private agreements, a respectable number hold that it is void.
Bank of La Junta v. Mock, 7o Colo. 517, 2o3 Pac. 272 (1922); Wright v.
Gardner, 98 Iy. 454, 33 S. V. 622 (1895) ; Shapley v. Abbott, 42 N. Y. 443
(i87O). The majority hold that it is valid, some on the sole ground that it
is not against public policy; State Loan Co. v. Cochran, I3O Cal. 245, 62 Pac.
466 (19oo); others, dodging the question of public policy, base the decision
on the ground of an estoppel in pais; State Trust Co. v. Sheldon, 68 Vt 259,
35 AtI. 177 (1895); Quick v. Corlies, 39 N. J. L. iI (1876), while one case
holds that the Statute runs on the promise not to plead and then on the obligation, thus doubling the statutory period. Hoffman v. Fisher, 2 W. N. C. i7
(Pa., 1875).
The public policy of a State in such a situation may be best found in the
intention of the Legislature as revealed in the Statute of Limitations, itself.
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The intention there is to provide, solely for the benefit of a party, a defense
which he may invoke if he chooses, and, having given the option it would
seem to be of no consequence to anyone, legislature, courts, or public, how that
option is exercised. Since the decision is entirely within the individual's control, it should not be against public policy that he have the right to bind himself
by contract not to plead the Statute. Parchen v. Chessman, 49 Mont. 326, 143
Pac. 631 (1914).
CONTRACTS-STATUTORY

PENALTIEs-EFFECT ON CIVIL RIGHTs-Plaintiff

left his truck with defendant for repairs, orally agreeing to pay the cost thereof,
approximately three hundred dollars. A statute, Conn. Acts 1921, Ch. 4o0, § 63,
required that all repairs to motor vehicles in excess of fifty dollars be authorized in writing by the owner, and attached a penalty of fifty dollars for violation. The defendant failed to obtain such written authority. Upon completion
of the repairs, the plaintiff refused to pay the entire amount, and when the
defendant refused to deliver the truck, brought an action of replevin. Held:
Plaintiff entitled to possession of the truck upon tender of fifty dollars.
Di Biase v. Garnsey, Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut, October 2, 1925.
Frequently a statute imposes a penalty upon an act without prohibiting it
or expressly declaring it illegal or void. In cases of this kind, the decisions
of the courts are not in harmony. Some courts hold that an agreement founded
on or for the doing of such penalized act is void, reasoning that a penrlty
implies a prohibition even though there are no prohibitory words in the statute.
Sagal v. Fylar, 89 Conn. 293, 93 Atl. io7 (1915) ; Doe v. Burnhain, 31 N. H.
426 (1855); Columbia Bridge Co. v. Haldeman, 7 W. & S.. 233 (Pa., 1844);
Holt v. Green, 73 Pa. 198 (1873). Others have regarded the question as one
of legislative intent, and have declared the proper rule to be that the courts
will look to the language of the statute and the purpose sought to be accomplished in its enactment; and if, from these, it is manifest that it was not
intended to imply a prohibition or to render the prohibited act void, the
courts will construe the statute accordingly. National Bank v. Matthews, 98
U. S. 621 (1878) ; Coombs v. Emery, 14 Me. 4o4 (1837) ; Buckman v. Berghols,
37 N. J. L. 437 (1874).
It is believed that the instant case would be correctly decided under either
theory, since the court says that the purpose of the statute was to put the
parties to such contracts in a position of honesty and fair dealing.
DAMAGES-PROXIMATE CAUSATION-LowERED VITALITY RESULTING IN
SUBSEQUENT DIsEAsE-Fifteen months before he died of tuberculosis, deceased

had, due to defendant's negligence, received certain injuries which had lessened
his power of resistance to disease. But during the interval he had worked
as an embalmer and had also at times unwisely exposed himself in inclement
weather. Held: Defendant not liable in damages for the deceaseds death.
Miqliaccio v. Public Service Ry. Co., 13o Atl. 9 (N. J., 1925).
The broad general rule is that a lowered vitality and a lessened power of
resistance, alone, are insufficient to form a causal connection between an injury

and a subsequent disease.

Gray v. Chicago, etc., Ry., 153 Wis. 637, 142 N. W.
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505 (1913). Perhaps a more satisfactory statement, of the converse rule, is
that defendant's negligence may be regarded as the direct cause of a disease
which, from causes not attributable to treatment, improper habits, or peculiar
constitutional tendencies, frequently develops from personal injuries. See Dickson v. Hollister, 123 Pa. 42i, 431, 16 Atl. 484, 487 (1889). Thus where a
flesh wound developed erysipelas, not attributable to improper treatment, recovery was permitted. Dickson v. Hollister, supra. Similarly, a verdict in favor
of a workman, previously robust and healthy, who developed consumption four
months after being struck on the chest by a heavy timber, was upheld. SeckAnd the same
inger v. PhilibertMfg. Co., 129 Mo. 590, 31 S. W. 957 (895).
decision was reached where a previously healthy boy, partially paralyzed by
defendants negligence, died five months later of pneumonia, contracted under
the ordinary conditions of the sick room. Beauchamp v. Mining Co., 50 Mich.
63, 15 N. W. 65 (1883). And it makes no difference that a disease so contracted is epidemic in the community at the time. Terre Haute Ry. v. Buck,
96 Ind. 346 (1884). But in the principal case, inasmuch as the deceased's
occupation abnormally exposed him to the disease germs and his indiscretion
increased his susceptibility, the result seems to be consistent with the general
law on the subject. In applying the same principle to a case where expert
medical testimony was relied upon, it has been recently held that such testimony
must be to the effect that the disease "most probably" resulted from the injury
to entitle it to consideration. McCrosson v. P. R. T. Co., 283 Pa. 492, 129 Atl.
568 (1925). Apparently only the presence of some unusual intervening cause
in that case could explain the physician's unwillingness to testify more positively.
EVIDENcE-MEMORANDA USED By WITNESs-RIGHT OF OPPOSING COUNSM
INsPEcT-Defendant was on trial on a criminal charge. A witness for the
state used a private memorandum to refresh his memory. The court refused
to allow the counsel for the defendant to see the book or to cross-examine the
witness about the paper. Held: No error. Adams v. State, 128 S. E. 924
TO

(Ga., 1925).

The great weight of authority is opposed to this decision, holding that a
memorandum once put into the hands of a witness to refresh his memory should
be open to the inspection of counsel and jury and to the cross-examination of
the former. Some courts merely state it as a recognized and universal rule
of evidence. Gregory v. Tavernor, 6 C. & P. 28o (Eng., 1833); Morris v.
United States, 149 Fed. 123 (C. C. A., 197). Others support the rule on the
ground of protection for the opposing party in avoiding imposition and false
aids; Capital Traction Company v. Hoover, 45 D. C. App. 247 (1916) ; Duncan
v. Seely, 34 Mich. 369 (1876); Tibbets v. Sternberg, 66 Barb. 2o (N. Y.,
187o) ; and on the fact that an inspection of the memorandum may reveal its
insufficiency to refresh the memory, or circumstances that would detract from
its credibility. Acklen's Executor v. Hickman, 63 Ala. 494 (1879) ; Harman v.
Illinois & Eastern Coal Co., 237 Ill. 36, 86 N. E. 625 (19o8) ; Commonwealth v.
Jeffs, 132 Mass. 5 (1882).
The court in the principal case based its decision on Schall v. Eisner,
58 Ga. i9o (1877), and Smith v. State, 17 Ga. App. 298, 86 S. E. 66o (1915).
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These cases, however, did not discuss the question involved here, but merely
held that memoranda used to refresh the memory were not in themselves evidence. That does not necessarily mean that counsel may not inspect them or
cross-examine on them.
There is some authority for the decision. Wabash 6' Erie Canal v.
Bledsoe, 5 Ind. 133 (1854) ; Bank of Du Bois v. Bank of Williamsport, I4
Pa. 8 (1886) ; State v. Collins, 15 S. C. 373 (I881). But it seems to be based
on no sound principle, relying mainly on the inference that the memoranda,
not being evidence, cannot be inspected.
FoRFEITURE-SEIzuRE By STATE OFFICERS FOR UNITED STATEs-State officers seized without warrant an automobile transporting intoxicating liquors,
and turned it over to Federal prohibition enforcement agents. A proceeding
brought, under Volstead Act, § 26, to forfeit the car, was opposed on the
ground that an illegal seizure cannot be the basis of a forfeiture. Held: Forfeiture allowed. U. S. v. One Reo Motor Truck, 6 Fed. (2d) 412 (D.
C., 1925).
The Federal courts are not agreed whether a forfeiture can be based on
a seizure made by an unauthorized person. It is held in U. S. v. Story, 294
Fed. 517 (C. C. A., 1923), and in U. S. v. Two Automobiles, 2 Fed. (2d)
264 (D. C., 1924), that a forfeiture may follow, while in U. S. v. Loomis, 297
Fed. 359 (C. C. 'A., 1924), the contrary is held. The former view is authorized
by a doctrine laid down by Story, J., in The Caledonian, 17 U. S. 100 (IS9),
and again in Taylor v. U. S., 44 U. S. 197 (1845), to the effect that any person
may at his risk seize for the purpose of enforcing a forfeiture, notwithstanding
that he act without authority or that the seizure is otherwise irregular. This
doctrine was rejected in U. S. v. Loomis, supra, as not authoritative, because
in those decisions of Story, J., the seizures were made by agents of the Federal
government. While this is true, an examination of the cases shows that Story,
I., far from indulging in mere dictum, purposely based his decisions on a
general principle of common law. Until U. S. v. Loomis, stupra, his doctrine
seems not to have been challenged; and therefore, in view of this state of the
law, the instant case seems sound.
An attempt was also made to put the decision upon an actual seizure by
the Federal officers. Since the car was turned over to them almost immediately after the seizure, the court thought the transportation in general had
not ceased. But such a view tends to raise perplexing questions as to how
much time may intervene before it will be said that the act of transporting
ceases. It is submitted, therefore, that the decision is best supported on
Justice Story's doctrine.
HUSBAND

AND WIFE-ANNULMENT

OF MARRIAGE FOR CONCEALMENT OF

PRIOR INSANITY-Under this title in the November issue of the LAW REvIEw,
at page 97, the statement is made that the Pennsylvania Act of 1905, P. L. 211,
Pa. St. 1920, § 9148, allows a divorce from an insane spouse. This was erroneous, the Act having been construed, in Baughnman v. Baughman, 34 Pa. Super.
27 r (i9O7), to relate only to jurisdiction. Insanity of a spouse is not ground
for divorce in Pennsylvania. Mintz v. Mints, 83 Pa. Super. 85 (924).
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LARCENY-LOsT PROPERTY-CoNSTRUCTIVE PossEssioN-Defendant was inadvertently given a sack of money pinned to a dress along with other clothes
to be washed. She subsequently discovered the sack of money floating in the
wash tub and converted it to her own use, there being evidence of intention
to convert at the time of the discovery. Held: Larceny, Sessions v. State,
274 S. W. 58o (Tex., 1925).
The ground on which the court based its decision was that this money
was "lost property" which remained in the constructive possession of the real
owner.
The correct definition of what constitutes lost property is: "To lose is not
to place or put anything carefully and voluntarily in the place you intend
and then forget it, it is casually and involuntarily to part from the possession."
Lawrence v. State, i Humph. 228 (Tenn., i839). In accord are Foulke v.
R. R., 228 N. Y. 269, 127 N. E. 237 (1920); Hamaker v. Blanchard, go Pa.
377 (1879); Moxie v. State, 54 Tex. Cr. R. 529, 114 S. W. 375 (i9o8); 25
C. J. 1134. England follows the same general view. Cartwright v. Green,
8 Ves. Jr. 405 (Eng., 18o3).

The cases cited by the Texas court in support of its stand were decided
on quite different facts, being principally cases of pocketbooks dropped in
public streets and other more or less public places. However, the case of
Robinson v. State, ii

Tex. App. 4o3 (1882),

also cited by the court, is in

accord with the interpretation given to the facts. There a merchant put
clothes in a trunk, and his clerk later sold the trunk to the defendant, neither
of them knowing it contained anything. In its opinion the court said: "The
goods so far as these parties were concerned were lost," "they were in every
sense lost goods which he [defendant] found." But the court also said the
goods could be considered as mislaid. And in Moxie v. State, supra, the court
held that a purse which had been forgotten and left in a buggy was not lost
property.
The case is interesting because of the court's interpretation of the facts.
The conviction would be proper on the grounds that the possession of the
money had never been given to the defendant; Merry v. Green, 7 M. & W.
623 (Eng., 1841); or on the theory of larceny of mislaid property. A conviction would also be proper under an indictment for larceny by bailee. But
the money certainly was not "lost property."
PRoHIaITIoN LAw-PossEssION

OF LIQUOR-REQUMEMENTs-Defendant,

suspected of committing robbery, was arrested by military police while driving
his automobile through a military reservation. He was surrendered to county
officials, but released on the charge. Before he left the building his automobile
was searched by county officials and hidden liquor was discovered. He was
arrested for the unlawful possession of liquor. Held: Liquor inadmissible as
evidence. State, et al., v. Ethridge,238 Pac. ig (Wash., 1925).
Possession of liquor has been defined as the owning or having of it in
one's power. Thomas v. State, 232 S. W. 826 (Tex., 192i) ; State v. SpillIn the instant case the court
man, iio Wash. 662, 188 Pac. 915 (Ig20).
reasoned that the control of the defendant's person and effects becoming absolute as the concomitants of arrest, the possession of the liquor was in the
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military police and not the defendant, and lack of knowledge, by the military
police, of the hidden liquor was immaterial.
Although power to control is important, the court seems to overlook the
fact that possession of a chattel (the liquor) is not necessarily identical with
possession of its receptacle (the automobile). For to possess the contents
of the receptacle, one must know of its existence, or at least consent to assume
control of whatever it may contain. Merry v. Green, 7 M. & W. 623 (Eng.,
x841) ; Durfee v. Jones, ii R. I. 588 (1877). And here there is no evidence
of an intention to assume control of whatever the automobile may contain.
But even granting that the military police had gotten possession of the
liquor, the decision is still difficult to sustain in the face of the fact that the
liquor was seized after the defendant had been released. For, having been
released on the charge on which he was taken into custody, how can it be said
that the military police were still in possession of him and his effects, and if
so, upon what grounds? In the light of its reasoning in the instant case, an
interesting problem would have been presented to the court, if liquor had been
found on the defendant's person under the same circumstances.
SALES-PAYMENT-BANx DEPOSIT AS TENDn-In consideration of five
dollars, the plaintiff received an option from the defendant to purchase certain
timber for fifteen hundred dollars. Upon payment of the purchase price, title
was to be transferred to the plaintiff. Prior to the expiration of the option,
plaintiff wired the defendant that he would take the property, and that the
deed was to be forwarded to the Old National Bank, Spokane, where the
proper sum was on deposit to take up the deed. The defendant refused to
convey the timber. Held: The deposit of money to the credit of the seller
and notifying him of it does not constitute a tender. Chambers v. Slethei,
238 Pac. 924 (Wash., 1925).
Ordinarily a tender in satisfaction of an obligation payable in money, to
be unobjectionable, must be in such form of money as is, at the time, legal
tender for the payment of debt. Martin v. Bott, 17 Ind. App. 444, 46 N. E. I51
(1897) ; 38 Cyc. 146. Thus a check is not ordinarily a good tender. Harding v.
Commercial Loan Co., 84 Ill. 251 (1876); In re Collyer, 124 App. Div. 16,
io8 N. Y. Supp. 6oo (19o8). The rule is applied to certified checks in
Holland v. Mutual Fertilizer Co., 8 Ga. App. 714, 70 S. E. 151 (i9i); Hobbs
v. Ray, 29 Ky. L. Rep. 999, 96 S. W. 589 (igo6). In exact accord with the
principal case, that a mere deposit in bank in the name of the party to whom
a tender is desired to be made, and notice to him is not a tender at all, is
CassnYle R. M. Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., ioS Mo. App. 146, 79 S. W. 720 (i9o4).
But the rule has been modified in a number of jurisdictions which hold that
tender of a bank check; Kollits v. Equitable Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 92 Minn.

234, 99 N. W. 892 (1904) ; Pershing v. Feinberg, 203 Pa. 144, 52 At. 22
(i9o2) ; or certificate of deposit; Gradle v. Warner, 14o Ill. 123, 29 N. E.

1118 (1892); in payment of a debt is a good tender unless it is specifically
refused on the ground that it is not lawful money.
It would seem that the latter is the better view, and more in accord with
business practice. To say, as does the instant case, that a deposit in the
name of the seller is not a good tender, is to deny to commerce the use of the
bank, its main channel of payment.

RECENT CASES
TAXATION-EsTATE TAX-INcLUSION iN NET ESTATE OF Lin INsURANCE
PAYABLE DIRECTLY TO BEEFxicuamEs-Suit

was brought by executors of an

estate to recover taxes paid upon the proceeds of insurance policies payable
directly to the beneficiaries, and included in the value of the net estate under
§ 402 (f) of the Act of i919, 40 STAT. I057, C. I8. All the policies involved
had been taken out prior to the passage of the act. Held: Judgment for plaintiffs. Lewellyn v. Frick, 268 U. S. 238 (1925).
The decision of the Supreme Court went upon the ground that the provision of the act was not retroactive, and did not apply to the policies in question.
This was in pursuance of the rule that acts of Congress should be construed, if
possible, so as to avoid questions of constitutionality. See Panama R. R. Co. v.
The constitutionality of the tax was
Johnson, 264 U. S. 375, 390 (1924).
undecided.
accordingly left
The estate tax imposed by the Act is an excise upon the right to transmit
It taxes "not the
property. Y. M. C. A. v. Davis, 264 U. S. 47 (1924).
interest to which some person succeeds on a death, but the interest which
ceased by reason of death." See Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41, 49 (1902).
The Act levies a tax equal to a percentage of the net estate transmitted.
An insurance policy, and the
Edwards v. Slocum, 264 U. S. 61 (1924).
right to the money to become due under it, become vested in the beneficiary
the moment it is issued. Tyler v. Treasurer and Receiver General, 26 Mass.
3o6, 115 N. E. 3oo (1917); Parsons Estate, 117 App. Div. 321, 102 N. Y.
Supp. i68 (i9o7) ; Entwhistle v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 2=2 Pa. 41, 51 Atl. 759
(i9o2). It would seem to follow that the proceeds of insurance policies payable directly to beneficiaries do not form a part of the estate of the decedent.
It was contended for the government that the inclusion of the proceeds of
the policies was not a tax upon the property, but a reasonable measure of the
excise. But there is no transmission of property upon the value of which the
percentage of taxation is based. Calling the value of the prospects of the
policies a mere measure of the transfer tax is not consistent with the liability
imposed upon the beneficiaries by §§ 4o8 and 4o9 of the act. The decision of
the District Court was based squarely upon the unconstitutionality of the tax.
Frick v. Lewellyn, 298 Fed. 803 (D. C., 1924).
The Supreme Court said in its opinion that a serious question must be
answered before the tax could be upheld. A case requiring a decision on the
point will undoubtedly be presented in the near future.
TORTS-NEGLIGExcE--ATTRAcTIVE NUISANcE-Plaintiffs were mothers of
deceased children, killed by a cave-in of an embankment in defendant's sand
quarry in which they were trespassing. The quarry was fenced and the
children had been repeatedly warned out by the defendant and others. The
bank was mixed with clay to prevent falling, and the cave-in would not have
occurred but for holes dug under the bank by the children. Held: Judgment
for plaintiffs. Baxter v. Park, Supreme Court of South Dakota, September
18, 1925.
Some courts do not recognize the attractive nuisance doctrine with respect
to trespassing children. Skaling v. Sheedy, IOI Conn. 545, 126 Atl. 72r
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(1924) ; State v. Bealmear, 13o AtI. 66 (Md., 1925) ; Daniels v. N. Y. & N. E.
R. R., 154 Mass. 349, 28 N. E. 283 (i8g1). Other courts allow recovery, permitting the jury to find anything with which a child can play an attractive
nuisance and no amount of precaution by the land owner sufficient, thereby
making him practically the insurer of all children. Traction Co. v. Stark, 74
Ind. App. 669, 127 N. E. 460 (192o); Mattson v. R. R., 95 Minn. 477, IO4
N. W. 443 (192o). The majority have at some time followed the latter rule,
but seeing danger in the extent to which it may be carried, have placed arbitrary limitations upon it without clearly overruling their previous decisions,
nevertheless making the rule practically ineffective. Some of these limitations
are that the attraction must be visible from the street, or inherently dangerous,
or dangerous machinery, or an unnatural use of the land, or the precautions
need only be in proportion to the value of the property. United Zinc Co. v.
Britt, 258 U. S. 268 (1922); Polk v. Cemetery, 37 Cal. App. 624, 174 Pac.
414 (1918); Parkes v. Telephone Co., 120 Misc. 459, I98 N. Y. Supp. 698
(1923) ; Ansell v. Philadelphia,276 Pa. 370, 12o Atl. 277 (1923).

Since the defendant in the instant case seems to have taken all reasonable
precautions commensurate with the value of his business, the court might have
found little difficulty in bringing this case within one of the exceptions favored
by the modem tendency.
TRUSTS-CONDITIONS-ESTRAINT ON FREEDom OF WORSHIP-A deed of
trust was executed by a grandfather to provide for the education and support
of his three-year-old grandson-but only so long as the latter should be brought
up and reared in the Roman Catholic faith. It was argued that this condition
if allowed would deprive the infant of his right to freedom of worship. Held:
Condition void; the beneficiary entitled to the income free of the restriction.
Devlin's Trust Estate, 284 Pa. 1I, 13o Atl. 238 (1925).
This very question has arisen in a number of jurisdictions and has invariably
been settled the other way. Hodgson v. Halford, L. R. ii Ch. D. 959 (Eng.,
1879) ; Magee v. O'Neill, 19 S. C. 17o (1882); Re Paulson, 127 Wis. 612, lO7
N. W. 484 (19o6). Sometimes the condition has concerned marriage into or
out of a certain church; Haughton v. Haughton, i Mol. 6II (Ir., 1824);
Re Knox, 23 L. R. Ir. 542 (1889); Renaud v. Lamothe, 32 Can. S. C. Rep.
357 (19o2); and sometimes the taking of religious orders. Re Trust Funds,
I Sim. N. S. 37 (Eng., 1850); Barnum v. Baltimore, 62 Md. 275 (1884);
Kenyon v. See, 94 N. Y. 563 (1884). A different but analogous point is
raised when loyalty to a religion is made a condition subsequent to membership in a benefit society. Mazurkiewicz v. St. Adelbertus Aid Society, 12-.
Mich. 145, 86 N. W. 543 (igoi) ; Franta v. Bohemian, 164 Mo. 3o4, 63 S. W.
rioo (igoi). In all these cases the condition was held valid.
The Pennsylvania rule governing the principal case was laid down in.

Drace v. Klinedinst, 275 Pa. 266, 118 Ati. 9o7 (1922).

There the condition

was in a will; and the court held that public policy prohibited such religious
control by a testator through the disposition of his property.
It is submitted that the constitutional provisions concern only interference
by the state with religious liberty; and that this public policy, if consistently
applied, would forbid most gifts to religious organizations.

RECENT CASES
WILLS--RIGHT

OF

CODICILLARY

LEGATEE

TO

TAKE

UNDER

RESIDUARY

CLAUSE OF WiiLL-Testatrix by will devised the remainder of her estate to the
"persons herein named as legatees." Later by a codicil some of the legatees
named in the will having died, she revoked their legacies and in lieu thereof
gave them to A, B and C. Held: The latter cannot take under the residuary
clause of the will. Lodge v. Grubb, 13o AtI. 28 (Del., 1925).
If a legacy given in a codicil is expressly stated to be on the same conditions
as the legacy given to that person in the will, the court will, of course, enforce the
evident intention of the testator. Cooper v. Day, 36 Ch. 59 (Eng., 1817). So
also if the second legacy is declared to be given in "addition to" or in "substitution for" the legacy given by the will. Cooper v. Day, supra; Day v. Croft, 49
Rolls 456 (Eng., 1841 ) ; Earl of Shaftsbury v. Duke of Marlborough, 58 Ch.
827 (Eng., 1884). But there is no inference that a legacy bequeathed by a codicil stands on the same footing with a legacy bequeathed in the will for which it
has been substituted. It cannot, for instance, enjoy any exemption from duty
given to the legacy created by the will unless an intention to exempt is clearly
indicated. Burrows v. Cottrell, 57 Ch. io38 (Eng., i83o). Moreover, the general rule that a substituted bequest is subject to the same provisions as the
original bequest does not apply where the bequests are not to the same person.
Chatteris v. Young, 38 Ch. 304 (Eng., 1827) ; Re Gibson, 70 Ch. 1222 (Eng.,
1861).
Pennsylvania seems contrary-that in such a case there is a subrogation entitling the legatee substituted in the codicil to stand on the same footing with
the one named in the will. Alsop's Appeal, 9 Barr 374 (Pa., 1848). The instant case is in accord with the English view, and opposed to that of Pennsylvania. There appears to be no other American case on the point.

